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NO-SOLICITATION AND NO-DISTRIBUTION RULES:
PRESUMPTIVE VALIDITY AND DISCRIMINATION
Unions may use various methods in an attempt to organize employees,
including oral solicitation and distribution of printed material on company
property. The employer may prohibit all solicitation and distribution by
employee or nonemployee organizers, or the prohibition may be absolute
as to nonemployees and limited as to employees. The permissible scope
of the restrictions may vary as to whether the parties are on their working
time or not, or whether they are in a working or nonworking area. More-
over, different standards may apply as to solicitation as opposed to dis-
tribution rules.
Under section 8(a) (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act,1
an employer may not "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise" of their "right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations .... "2 Since the above-described rules may restrict
organizational efforts, they must be reconciled with this statutory command.
Although the section 8(a) (1) prohibition of employer interference with
employee organization restricts the employer's formerly unrestricted power
to forbid all solicitation and distribution on his property, it is clear that
it cannot be read as a total abrogation of his right to regulate the conduct
of both employees and nonemployees. 3  Consequently, in determining
the validity of no-solicitation and no-distribution rules, consideration
must be given to the employer's right to prevent anticipated or actual
interference with business efficiency and production. In balancing these
factors, the Board,4 with court approval, 5 rejected a case-by-case approach
in this area and instead established presumptions of validity 6 and in-
validity 7 of no-solicitation and no-distribution rules depending upon the
161 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958) [hereinafter referred to as
"the Act"].
2Labor Management Relations Act § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1958).
3 See NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 361-64 (1958); NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) ; Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793 (1945).
4 See, e.g., Maxam Buffalo, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1962); Walton Mfg. Co.,
126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961); Peyton Packing
Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 730 (1944).
5 NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958); NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793
(1945); NLRB v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 271 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1959); NLRB v.
Murphy Diesel Co., 263 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1959).
6 Star-Brite Indus., Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1960); Hot Point Co., 120 N.L.R.B.
1768 (1958); Pacemaker Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 987 (1958); Atlas Boot Mfg. Co.,
116 N.L.R.B. 565 (1956); Dixie Furniture Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1952); Dallas
Tank & Welding Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 1315 (1943).
7 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 849 (1962); Young Spring
& Wire Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 643 (1962); Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B.
615 (1962); American Screen Prods. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 87 (1962); Texas Aluminum
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scope of the restriction. Two approaches can be discerned for deciding
which presumptions should be established and the kind of evidence neces-
sary to overcome them. For convenience, they may be termed the
"harm-to-the-employees" and the "need-of-the-employer" approaches.
Both recognize the need for a balancing of the conflicting rights of em-
ployer and employees, but each starts at a different pole, assigns different
weights to the relevant factors, and often produces opposite conclusions.
Underlying the "harm-to-the-employees" approach is the analysis that
prior to the enactment of section 8(a) (1), an employer could lawfully
prohibit all organizational activities on his property; 8 section 8(a) (1) was
intended to limit this right only to the extent necessary to enable the
employees to organize. Consequently, an employer should be permitted to
prohibit such activity unless the employees can show significant harm to
their organizational efforts. Moreover, an employer should be permitted
to rebut any presumption of invalidity by showing that his particular
restriction does not cause significant harm to the employees because
reasonable alternatives are available. However, this approach completely
ignores the employer's discriminatory motive and also seems to ignore
the underlying policy of the Labor Management Relations Act of en-
couraging employee organization.9
Under the "need-of-the-employer" approach, section 8(a) (1) is
interpreted as a repudiation of the theory that an employer's property
rights alone justify restriction of employee organizational activities; such
restriction is unlawful if it has no business justification, regardless of its
effect on the employees' organizational effort. Any restriction of organi-
zational solicitation and distribution is considered unlawful absent proof or
a rational basis for presuming that the particular restriction is necessary
to prevent anticipated or actual interference with business efficiency and
production. This remedies the deficiencies of the "harm-to-the-employees"
approach by demonstrating concern for the employer's motive.
I. WORKING TIME RULES
The Board has consistently declared that no-solicitation and no-
distribution 10 rules are presumptively valid insofar as applicable only dur-
Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 443 (1961), enforced, 300 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1962); Linda Jo
Shoe Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 179, 184-85 (1960), enforced, 307 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1962) ;
Meier & Frank Co., 89 N.L.R1B. 1016, 1017 (1950); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.
R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
730 (1944).
8 See United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rez'd
on other grounds, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
9 Cf. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). For a legislative statement of this policy,
see 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §141(b) (1958); 61 Stat. 136-37 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
10 The rule need not be enforced to be invalid since mere promulgation may have
a deterrent effect on the employees' organizational activity. See NLRB v. Great
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ing the employees' working time. 1 This presumption is consistent with
a "need-of-the-employer" approach since in most instances such bans will
be motivated by the employer's desire to prevent business interference
caused by such organizational activity.
The person who is the object of solicitation or distribution is *usually
distracted from his work, though such distraction and its impact on business
production may vary accprding to the type of business involved.12  Since
it is reasonable to presume that working time solicitation and distribution
bans are motivated by a valid business interest, it is proper to place the
burden of establishing discriminatory motive or enforcement upon the
challenging party. The definition of "working time" in this context is
practical and flexible 18 in that it does not include the entire workday; 14 an
employee is not on his working time during lunch 15 or similar rest
periods. 16  The test seems to be whether he is performing his functions as
an employee at that time.
At. & Pac. Tea Co., 277 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 86 N.L.R.B.
470 (1949); Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 904, 906 (1948); cf. NLRB v.
Glenn L. Martin-Neb. Co., 141 F. 2d 371 (8th Cir. 1944). This fact has sometimes
been ignored. See Wah Chang Corp. v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1962);
NLRB v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 155 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1946).
11 NLRB v. W. T. Grant Co., 315 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Empire
Mfg. Corp., 260 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1958); Olin Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 613
(5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 919 (1952); NLRB v, Montgomery Ward &
Co., 157 F.2d 486, 493-94 (8th Cir. 1946) ; NLRB v. Edinburg Citrus Ass'n, 147 F.2d
353 (5th Cir. 1945); Valley Feed & Supply Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 778, 793 (1962);
Georgia-Pac. Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 612, 615-16 (1961); Midwestern Instruments, Inc.,
131 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1961); Laub Baking Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 869 (1961); Delta
Finishing Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 659, 661 (1955); Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B.
1186, 1187 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1944), affd, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) ;
Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
12 For example, protracted solicitation may have an insignificant impact on the
efficiency of a truck driver who is being solicited by his alternate in the cab. The
legality of banning such solicitation, even though the employees are on their working
time, is doubtful because of the tenuous connection between the ban and a legitimate
business need; cf. NLRB v. Floridan Hotel, Inc., 318 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1963)
(absent special circumstances, employer may not ban employee wearing of union
buttons) ; NLRB v. Power Equip. Co., 313 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1963) (union inscribed
shirts); Bilton Insulation, Inc. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1961) (union
buttons) ; Kimble Glass Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1956) (union badges).
An employer demonstration of serious business need may justify prohibitions of union
button wearing. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 357 (7th Cir.
1956); Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1954). Even a brief
solicitation or distribution may have a serious impact on the efficiency of assembly-
line employees. See Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943), enforced,
142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
13 See, e.g NLRB v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 262 F.2d 812 (5th Cir.
1959) ; Midland Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 10 (1961).
14 See NLRB v. Monarch Tool Co., 210 F.2d 183 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 967 (1954); Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 356, 363 (1956); cf.
Florida Sugar Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 53 L.R.R.M. 1060 (1963); Cal-Style
Furniture Mfg. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 52 L.R.R.M. 1368 (1963).
15 Olin Indus., Inc., 191 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 919
(1952); I. F. Sales Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 137 (1949).
16 See, e.g., NLRB v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 262 F.2d 812 (5th Cir.
1959) ; NLRB v. Essex Wire Corp., 245 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1957) ; NLRB v. Monarch
Tool Co., 210 F.2d 183, 187 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954).
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II. NONWORKING TIME RULES
A. No-Solicitation Rules
Rules prohibiting employee solicitation during the nonworking time
of both the soliciting and solicited employees, whether in working or
nonworking areas, are invalid 1 7 unless the employer can show special
circumstances-that because of the peculiar nature of his business, non-
working time solicitation is disruptive of the efficiency of the business.'
8
Again, the Board has adopted a pure "need-of-the-employer" approach, rea-
soning that in most cases restrictions of employee solicitation during non-
working time are not justified by any legitimate business purpose. It is
therefore reasonable to presume that the restriction is invalid either because
it is designed to frustrate employee organizational efforts, or because it con-
stitutes unwarranted interference with such efforts.'
9 Moreover, an em-
ployer's demonstration of a lack of discriminatory purpose will not overcome
this presumption. Absent a showing of special circumstances, the restric-
tion is conclusively presumed to be unlawful insofar as applicable to non-
working time solicitation, regardless of its impact on the employees' organ-
izational ability, since lack of "harm-to-the-employees" cannot validate
such a broad solicitation ban? °
B. No-Distribution Rules
In contrast to the Board's consistent treatment of no-solicitation
rules, nonworking time no-distribution rules "have had a checkered his-
tory." 21 In early cases the Board held that a mere employer assertion
of a litter-prevention motive would justify a prohibition of all distribution
17Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 849 (1962); Republic
Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1187 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 193 (2d Cir.
1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44
(1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944);
Carter Carburetor Corp., 48 N.L.R.B. 354, 355-56 (1943), enforced, 140 F.2d 714
(8th Cir. 1944); United States Cartridge Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 896, 897-98 (1943);
Denver Tent & Awning Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 586, 592-93, enforced, 138 F.2d 410
(10th Cir. 1943). But cf. Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 800 (6th
Cir. 1940). However, because of the peculiar circumstances of the business, retail
stores are permitted to ban all solicitation on the selling floors. NLRB v. May
Dep't Stores Co., 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 725 (1946) ; Marshall
Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952); cf. May Dep't Stores Co. v.
NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
18 See Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d
1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
19 See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1187 (1943), enforced,
142 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Peyton Packing Co., 49
N.L.R.B. 828 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730
(1944).
20 Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 622-23 (1962). Compare Re-
public Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), with NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
21 United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rev'd on
other grounds, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
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on company property,2 2 a presumption rebuttable only by showing serious
impairment of organizational efforts.2 The Board later abandoned this rule
and held that a nonworking time distribution ban was invalid, apparently
regardless of the plant area affected, absent an employer showing of special
circumstances. 4 However, the Board shortly thereafter overruled these
cases 2 and reestablished the prior rule that working time and nonworking
time distribution bans were presumptively valid, but in nonworking areas
the extent of lawful restriction remained unclear 6 In 1960 the Board
again considered this problem in Walton Mfg. Co.27 and, after reviewing
the leading no-solicitation and no-distribution cases,28 readopted the pure
"need-of-the-employer" approach, holding that a no-distribution rule is
presumptively invalid if applicable to nonworking time, whether in work-
ing or nonworking areas.
1. The Stoddard-Quirk Rule
In 1962 the Board again shifted ground, and in Stoddard-Quirk Mfg.
Co.29 held, two members dissenting, that although a no-distribution rule
is presumptively invalid as applied to nonworking time employee distribu-
tion in nonworking areas, it is presumptively valid as applied to even non-
working time distribution in the working areas. In reaching this result
the majority maintained that no case ever held that no-solicitation and
no-distribution rules should be equated as to presumptive validity.
Although the Board attempted to distinguish Walton,3 0 it is clear that
it overruled Walton in part and, more important, rejected the Walton
approach to the no-distribution rule issue.
22 See, e.g., Tabin-Picker & Co., 50 N.L.R.B. 928, 930 (1943).
23 See General Motors Corp., 73 N.L.R.B. 74, 76 (1947); Goodyear Aircraft
Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 502, 508 (1944) ; cf. North Am. Aviation, Inc., 56 N.L.R.B. 959,
961-62 (1944).
24 See Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 85 N.L.R.B. 1439, 1440 (1949); American Book-
Stratford Press, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 914, 915 (1948).
25 See Monolith Portland Cement Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1366 (1951) ; cf. Rock-
well Mfg. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 288, 289 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 109
(3d Cir. 1959).
26Delta Finishing Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 659, 661 (1955); Colonial Shirt Corp.,
96 N.L.R.B. 711, 713 (1951); Monolith Portland Cement Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1366
(1951); cf. Nutone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1164-65 (1955), modified sub nor.
United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1956), reed, 357 U.S. 357
(1958).
27126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961).
281d. at 697-98. The Board reviewed and concisely stated its interpretation of
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), and NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
20 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962); accord, General Indus. Electronics Co., 138 N.L.
R.B. 1371 (1962).
30 The Board distinguished Walton by stating in a footnote that any statements
in that case as to nonworking time no-distribution rules were unnecessary to the
decision. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 619 n.5 (1962). It is arguable
that the Board in Walton could have decided that the employer rule in question
violated § 8(a) (1) because it restricted nonworking time solicitation, see, e.g., Peyton
Packing Co., Inc., 49 N.L.R-B. 828, 843-44 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944) ; Carter Carburetor Corp., 48 N.L.R.B. 354,
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In rejecting Walton, the Stoddard-Quirk Board adopted a combina-
tion of the "need-of-the-employer" and the "harm-to-the-employees" ap-
proaches based upon a premise derived from Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB 31 and NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,32 that the validity of
solicitation and distribution bans depends on balancing the legitimate rights
of both employer and employees. The Board then proceeded to examine
the employer's need for a distribution ban and its impact on the employees'
organizational capability.
The Board maintained that, in sharp contrast to the business danger of
distracting employees by solicitation, distribution presented an additional
littering hazard which it considered sufficient to justify presumptive validity.
The Board found support for its holding in NLRB v. Le Tourneau
Co.P and NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.34  In Le Tourneau the Court
sustained the Board in holding unlawful an employer's ban of employee dis-
tribution in the company parking lot. Instead of simply invalidating the
rule because of its application to nonworking time, the Board in Le
Tourneau Co0 5 followed its then practice 3 6 of examining evidence as to the
effect of this restriction upon employee communication and balanced this
against the employer's necessity. It is therefore clear that the Board was
distinguishing between the presumptive validity of no-solicitation and no-
distribution rules. The majority in Stoddard-Quirk maintained that the
355-56 (1943), enforced, 140 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1944) ; United States Cartridge Co.,
47 N.L.R.B. 896 (1943); Denver Tent & Awning Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 586, enforced,
138 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1943), and was, therefore, not required to consider the
validity of the distributional aspects of the rule. It is also arguable that even as
to the latter issue the Board could have invalidated the rule insofar as it restricted
nonworking time distribution in nonworking areas, see, e.g., NLRB v. Caldwell
Furniture Co., 199 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 907 (1953) ; Le
Tourneau Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, order set aside, 143 F.2d 67 (1944), enforced, 324
U.S. 793 (1945), without deciding its validity as applied to working area distribution.
However, such interpretation of Walton ignores the fact that the issue before the
Board in that case was the validity of an integrated employer rule prohibiting both
solicitation and distribution at any time, anywhere on company property. NLRB v.
Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177, 179-80 (5th Cir. 1961). Thus the Walton Board
stated:
[W]e have here a no-solicitation and no-distribution rule applicable to em-
ployees during their non-working time, which rule is presumptively invalid,
in the absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary
in order to maintain production or discipline. As Respondent introduced
no evidence to show such special circumstances, the rule is invalid.
Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697, 699 (1960). Furthermore, it was necessary for
the Board to consider all aspects of the rule in order to issue a proper order for
rescission of the rule in both its solicitational and distributional aspects to the extent
that each was unlawful.
31324 U.S. 793 (1945). This case was decided together with NLRB v. Le
Tourneau Co.
32351 U.S. 105 (1956).
33324 U.S. 793 (1945).
34 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
3z54 N.L.R.B. 1253, enforcement denied, 143 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1944), rev'd,
324 U.S. 793 (1945).
36 See, e.g., Monolith Portland Cement Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951); General
Motors Corp., 73 N.L.R.B. 74 (1947); Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 502
(1944); North Am. Aviation, Inc., 56 N.L.R.B. 959 (1944); Tabin-Picker & Co.,
50 N.L.R.B. 928 (1943).
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Court, in upholding the Board, thereby approved this distinction. However,
the Court made no such intimations, but merely determined that the
Board's finding was supported by substantial evidence upon the entire
record. Consequently, the Board could establish a rule of presumptive
invalidity of nonworking time no-distribution rules 3 7 without coming in
conflict with the Court's holding in Le Tourneau.
In Babcock & Wilcox Co.,"8 the Board held invalid a parking lot dis-
tribution ban as applied to nonemployee organizers; but the Supreme Court
held that an employer may prohibit nonemployee distribution on his prop-
erty absent a showing that other avenues of contacting the employees out-
side of company property were inadequate.P9 Since section 8(a) (1) only
proscribes interference with employee organizational rights, nonemployees'
rights to organize on company property depend upon the effect which denial
of access would have on the employees' right to learn from them the ad-
vantages of self-organization. It is arguable that the employees' rights are
not infringed if reasonable alternatives of contacting them exist. Moreover,
employers may reasonably have legitimate business reasons for denying
access to nonemployees whose responsibility and honesty are unknown to
them.40 Nevertheless, the opinion may be read broadly to validate a ban
on all such nonemployee activity even if the purpose is to forestall organiza-
tion, as long as reasonable means of communication are available outside
company property and the ban is enforced without discrimination against all
nonemployee organizers. 41 Adopting the Babcock & Wilcox rationale, the
Board in Stoddard-Quirk reasoned that while effective solicitation requires
adequate time for employee discussion, effective distribution requires only
delivery of a printed message. Consequently, restrictions of nonworking
time solicitation even in working areas would have a serious impact on
employee communication; similar restrictions of distribution would have a
less serious impact, since literature may still be delivered to the employees
in nonworking areas-for example, at plant gates or in cafeterias. Bal-
ancing this absence of serious curtailment of the employees' overall com-
munication capabilities against the littering hazard, the Board held that a
broad working area distribution ban was valid.
A serious objection to this reasoning lies in the partial use of the
Babcock & Wilcox "harm-to-the-employees" test for judging restrictions
of employee distribution, notwithstanding the Court's statements in Babcock
& Wilcox that this test applied solely to restrictions of nonemployee organ-
37 See Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960).
38109 N.L.RtB. 485 (1954), enforcement denied, 222 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955),
aff'd, 351 U.S. 105 (1956). Two other cases posing the same issue were also decided
by the Court. Ranco, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 998 (1954), enforced, 222 F.2d 543 (6th.
Cir. 1955), rev'd, 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Seamprufe, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 24 (1954),
enforcement denied, 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955), affd, 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
39 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
40 See NLRB v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 277 F2d 759, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1960).
41 Cf. NLRB v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 225 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1955); Holyoke
Cinema Shops, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 1321 (1962); Salyer Stay Ready Filter Corp., 136
N.L.R.B. 1210 (1962).
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izational activity, 42 and that considerations of the employer's business needs
govern the validity of employee distribution restrictions. 43 The Board itself
in Stoddard-Quirk recognized this principle since it held that a prohibition
of employee nonworking time nonworking area distribution is presumptively
invalid even if alternate means of employee distribution are available off
company property. This undercuts the Board's working area distribution
reasoning, since it is difficult to see why the impact on *employee organiza-
tional efforts is relevant to the validity of working area distribution restric-
tions and irrelevant to the validity of nonworking area distribution re-
strictions. Therefore, Babcock & Wilcox is irrelevant to the validity of
employee distribution restriction.m "
2. An Alternative: The No-Littering Rule
Under the "need-of-the-employer" approach, the test of validity of a
working area distribution ban should be whether or not the employer needs,
or may be rationally presumed to need, the ban to prevent significant inter-
ference with business efficiency and production. Hence, the desirability
of the Stoddard-Quirk rule should depend upon the validity of the Board's
assumption that in most cases working area distribution prohibitions are
necessary to prevent significant littering. Even assuming the reality of
this alleged littering danger, if there is another effective means of litter
prevention, a nonworking time distribution ban, unjustified by business
necessity, should be considered unlawful either because the ban was de-
signed to impede employee organization, 45 or because even absent such a
purpose it is an unwarranted interference with employee organizational
activity.
46
One clearly lawful 47 alternative means of litter prevention, suggested
by the dissenters 48 in Stoddark-Quirk and given short shrift by the
majority,49 would be a rule prohibiting employee littering by which an
42 "No restriction may be placed on the employees' right to discuss self-organi-
zation among themselves, unless the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is
necessary to maintain production and discipline." NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956). See generally Note, 65 YALE L.J. 423 (1956).
43 See NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963). Contra,
NLRB v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 271 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1959).
4See NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963); May
Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 797, 799 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Lake
Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948).
45 See NLRB v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 143 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1944) ; Time-
0-Matic, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 179 (1958), enforced, 264 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1959);
Commercial Controls Corp., 118 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1957), enforced, 258 F.2d 102 (2d
Cir. 1958) ; cf. NLRB v. Essex Wire Corp., 245 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Kimble
Glass Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1956).
46 See, e.g., Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1959); cf.
Stewart Hog Ring Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 310 (1961).
47 See United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1956),
rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
48 Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 630 n.24 (1962).
49 Id. at 621 n.7.
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employer notifies all employees that they are subject to disciplinary action
if they discard the distributed union literature. Presumably this threat
would deter an individual from littering to the same extent as the same
penalty would deter him from distributing. Nevertheless, it may be argued
that normally there are more employee receivers and hence potential litterers
than distributors of union literature and, consequently, the penalty would
have to deter more individuals than if tied to a distribution ban. While
it is true that mathematically the chances of littering are greater under a
no-littering rule, it by no means follows that in most cases such a rule would
beineffective. The right of employees to be free from employer interference
in their organizational efforts should not turn on such conjecture but should
be restricted only where facts show a need for the protection of a legitimate
employer interest.50 If the rule proves ineffective, a subsequent no-distribu-
tion rule may be justified. The effect of the Walton rule of presumptive
invalidity of nonworking time distribution restrictions was merely to require
an employer showing of "special circumstances" to validate a broad dis-
tribution ban 51-- that maintenance of production, discipline, or efficiency
required a nonworking time distribution restriction.52 The Board has
had sufficient experience in past solicitation and distribution "special cir-
cumstances" cases to determine the factual question of whether there is
such a substantial business interference as to justify the restrictionpi Thus,
a mere anticipated danger of working area littering would not be sufficient
any more than a mere anticipated danger of working time employee dis-
traction would justify a working area solicitation ban.54 Similarly, the mere
possibility of a danger of littering would not justify a nonworking area
distribution prohibition even under the Stoddard-Quirk rule.5 Nor would
a few instances of littering justify either a working area or nonworking
area distribution ban.5 0 Instead, the employer would have to show that
50 See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956); Jacksonville
Motors, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 181 (1950).
51 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Walton Mfg.
Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960), enforced, 289 F2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Peyton Pack-
ing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944); cf. NLRB v. Floridan Hotel, Inc., 318 F2d 545 (5th
Cir. 1963).
52 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1956);
Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1954); cf. May Dep't Stores
Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944), modified, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir.), cert. den ied, 329
U.S. 725 (1946).
53 See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); NLRB
v. Floridan Hotel, Inc., 318 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB,
supra note 52; Jacksonville Motors, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 181 (1950) ; Peyton Packing
Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 730 (1944).
54 Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962); Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 849 (1962); Jacksonville Motors, Inc., supra note 53.
55 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) ; Minneapolis-Honey-
well Regulator Co., supra note 54.
5. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., supra note 54; cf. Jacksonville Motors,
Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 181 (1950).
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substantial littering caused interference with production, discipline, or
efficiency.
57
The Board, therefore, should abandon its new Stoddard-Quirk rule
and reestablish the Walton rule, allowing the employer to justify a working
area distribution ban to prevent littering only after an unsuccessful attempt
to enforce a no-littering rule.
Ill. DISCRIMINATORY ADOPTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PRESUMPTIVELY
VALID No-SOLICITATION AND No-DISTRIBUTION RULES
A presumptively valid no-solicitation or no-distribution rule will be
held violative of section 8(a) (1) if it is shown by the charging party 58
that the rule was promulgated to prevent employee organization rather
than for a legitimate business purpose.59 Discriminatory enforcement of a
presumptively valid rule also violates section 8(a) (1) 60 and, if such en-
forcement results in discharge, suspension, or other alteration of the em-
ployment status of a violator, 61 it also violates section 8(a) (3).162 The
57 See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) ; NLRB v.
United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963).
In rejecting a no-littering rule, the majority in Stoddard-Quirk posed a hypo-
thetical case: where one of two rival distributing factions deliberately discards the
other faction's literature in the working area, should both or only one lose its working
area distribution privilege? There is no reason why this problem would arise only
in working area distribution cases. See, e.g., Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
139 N.L.R.B. 849 (1962). Certainly, such a problem would not cause the Board to
validate a nonworking area distribution ban, even if the rule caused no serious impair-
ment of employee organizational efforts. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793 (1945); Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d
177 (5th Cir. 1961); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943), enforced,
142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944). In any event, this ques-
tion can be resolved under the existing "special circumstances" doctrine, which is
concerned only with the extent of distribution-caused business interference, and not
with the identity of the employees causing the interference, except where they are
the employer's agents. Consequently, if sufficient business interference occurs, the
employer may prohibit all working area distribution. See Republic Aviation Corp.
v. NLRB, spra; Walton Mfg. Co., supra; Peyton Packing Co., supra.
58 The burden of proof is on the General Counsel. See, e.g., Winett, Inc., 135
N.L.R.B. 1305 (1962) ; Continental Aviation & Eng'r Corp., 125 N.L.R.B. 624 (1959).
59 Revere Camera Co. v. NLRB, 304 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1962) ; NLRB v. Fair-
mont Creamery Co., 143 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1944); Carter Carburetor Corp. v.
NLRB, 140 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1944) ; NLRB v. Denver Tent & Awning Co., 138 F2d
410 (10th Cir. 1943); Outboard Marine Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 53 L.R.R.M.
1242 (1963); Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1114 (1953); Stainless Ware
Co. of America, 87 N.L.R.B. 138 (1949); Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.
R.B. 1358, 1364 (1949); Tomlinson of High Point, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 681, 688-89
(1947).
60 See, e.g., NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941) ; NLRB v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 224-26 (1940); cf. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17 (1954).
01 NLRB v. May Dep't Stores Co., 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946); NLRB v.
Peyton Packing Co., 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944);
"M" System, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 1281 (1959); William Davies Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 631
(1941), modified, 135 F.2d 179 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 770 (1943); cf.
Story Oldsmobile, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 1049 (1963).
6261 Stat. 14041 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) (1958). Enforcement of an
invalid rule by discharge or suspension would also violate § 8(a) (3). See, e.g.,
Texas Aluminum Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 443 (1961), enforced, 300 F.2d 315 (5th Cir.
1962).
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question of discrimination in either the adoption or enforcement of a rule
is one of fact, 5 so that the question can be resolved only after an examina-
tion of all the relevant facts and circumstances of each case.0 A considera-
tion of the principal factors relevant to such a determination is therefore
appropriate.
A. Timing of the Adoption or Enforcement of No-Solicitation
and No-Distribution Rules
If an employer, who has either never had 65 or never seriously en-
forced 6 a rule against solicitation or distribution, suddenly promulgates
such a rule or begins effectively to enforce an existing rule at the start of a
union organizational campaign, it is reasonable to infer that his new policy
is designed to limit the employees' organizational activity. 67  It should be
questioned, therefore, whether the purpose of this new policy is to prevent
anticipated interference with his business efficiency, discipline, and produc-
tion, or to forestall organization. This is particularly true when prior to
the organizational campaign, the employees were allowed to engage in a
significant amount of other solicitation or distribution, such as solicitations
for charitable organizations, baseball pools, athletic or social organizations,
and the like.68 However, as the Board has made clear,69 timing alone can-
not be determinative of discriminatory purpose. The employer may jus-
tifiably explain lack of prior restriction or enforcement on the ground that
in his judgment such activity never posed a serious threat to, or caused any
significant actual interference with, his business operations, and that he
63 See, e.g., NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 362-64 (1958) ; NLRB
v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 321 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Star-Brite Indus.,
Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1010-11 (1960).
04 See, e.g., ibid.; Continental Aviation & Eng'r Corp., 125 N.L.R.B, 624 (1959);
Carolina Mirror Corp., 123 N.L.R.B. 1712 (1959).
65 Time-O-Matic, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 179 (1958), enforced, 264 F.2d 96 (7th
Cir. 1959); Commercial Controls Corp., 118 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1957), enforced, 258
F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1959); Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1364
(1949); William Davies Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 631, 636 (1941), modified, 135 F2d 179
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 7M0 (1943).
66Revere Camera Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1658, 1663 (1961), enforced, 304 F.2d 162
(7th Cir. 1962); Botany Worsted Mills, 4 N.L.R.B. 292, 300-04 (1937), modified,
106 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1939).
67 Carolina Mirror Corp., 123 N.L.R.B. 1712 (1959) - cf. NLRB3 v. United Steel-
workers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958); Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 382
(1957), enforced, 262 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1959).
68Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 1046, 1071-72 (1956), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 258 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co.,
85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1364 (1949); Botany Worsted Mills, 4 N.L.R.B. 292, 300-04
(1937), modified, 106 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1939).
69 See. e.g., Beiser Aviation Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. 399, 422 (1962); Georgia-Pac.
Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 612, 615-16 (1961); Midwestern Instruments, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B.
1026 (1961); Laub Baking Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 869, 870 (1961) ; Star-Brite Indus.,
Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1010-11 (1960); cf. NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357
U.S. 357 (1958).
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fears that an organizational campaign now poses such a threat. Moreover,
unless the presumption of the validity of no-solicitation and no-distribution
rules of limited applicability is to be rendered meaningless, he should not
have to prove the business necessity of these rules merely because of the
timing of their promulgation or enforcement. However, the charging party
is able to prove that the purpose of the rule is to impede the employees'
organizational campaign.70 While it is true that even a showing of lack of
business necessity for the restriction does not ipso facto demonstrate dis-
criminatory purpose since the employer may have believed such necessity
existed, the absence of business necessity should be seriously considered by
the Board in evaluating the rule's validity. Convincing proof of absence of
business necessity should invalidate the restriction as an unwarranted inter-
ference with employee organizational activity.
71
B. Applicability or Enforcement of the Rules Solely to
"Union" Solicitation and Distribution
The clearest case of unlawful discrimination is the promulgation and
enforcement of a rule only against solicitation 72 or distribution 7- favorable
to a particular union, while solicitation or distribution favorable to another
union more acceptable to the employer is, with his knowledge,7 4 unre-
stricted. Similarly unlawful is the restriction of "prounion" solicitation 75
7o NLRB v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 143 F2d 668 (10th Cir. 1944); Western
Corrugated, Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1959); Time-O-Matic, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 179
(1958), enforced, 264 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Star-Brite Indus., Inc., supra note 69;
Commercial Controls Corp., 118 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1957), enforced, 258 F.2d 102 (2d
Cir. 1958); cf. NLRB v. American Compress Warehouse, Inc., 321 F.2d 547 (5th
Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Power Equip. Co., 313 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v.
Essex Wire Corp., 245 F2d 589 (9th Cir. 1957); Kimble Glass Co., 230 F.2d 484
(6th Cir. 1956); United Aircraft Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1632 (1961); Stewart Hog
Ring Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 310 (1961).
71 See Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 96, 101-02 (7th Cir. 1959).
72NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941); NLRB v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940); NLRB v. Gallup Am. Coal Co., 131 F.2d 665 (10th
Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Bersted Mfg. Co., 124 F.2d 409 (6th Cir.), amended, 128 F.2d
738 (6th Cir. 1942); American-West African Lines, Inc., 21 N.L.R.B. 691 (1940);
cf. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 78 (1940) ; NLRB v. Essex Wire Corp., 245 F.2d
589 (9th Cir. 1957).
73 See, e.g., NLRB v. Essex Wire Corp., .supra note 72; Carter Carburetor
Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1944); cf. Local 357, Teamsters Union v.
NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, supra
note 72.
74 See, e.g., Holyoke Cinema Shops, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 1321 (1962) ; Ford Radio
& Mica Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 1046, 1071 (1956), enforcement denied on other grounds,
258 F2d 457 (2d Cir. 1958); Airfan Radio Corp., 111 N.L.R.B. 566 (1955).
75 Revere Camera Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1658, 1663-65 (1961), enforced, 304 F.2d
162 (7th Cir. 1962); Franchester Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1391 (1954); Grand Cent.
Aircraft Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1114, 1127-31, 1147-49 (1953), enforced, 216 F.2d 572
(9th Cir. 1954) (per curiam); Cherry Rivet Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1303 (1952); Edi-
torial "El Imparcial", Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1795, 1796 (1951) ; Botany Worsted Mills,
4 N.L.R.B. 292, 300-04 (1937), modified, 106 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1939).
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and distribution 76 while the employer knowingly 77 permits "antiunion"
solicitation and distribution. Such patent discrimination not only con-
stitutes an interference with the employees' free choice, but also indicates
that the purpose of the restrictions is to impede organization rather than to
attain a legitimate business end.
Another factor relevant to discriminatory motive is the fact that the
employer's no-solicitation or no-distribution rule is enforced only against
union-oriented solicitation and distribution, while other forms of "outside"
solicitation and distribution ate not restricted.78  If this other "outside"
but nonunion solicitation or distribution is carried on to a significant degree
in terms of the number of employees affected, or the amount tif working time
lost, it may indicate that the restrictions are not imposed to protect any
legitimate employer interest but are primarily designed to hampe- the
organizational effort.W This conclusion is not inevitable since the employer
as a matter of business judgment may have decided that he cannot allow any
increase in such activity, and that he will forbid union-orlented activity
because such activity is potentially more emotional and dangerous in its
effect on employee discipline, efficiency, and production.8 0 However, since
it may be no more emotional or dangerous than some other "outside" forms
of activity, the employer's selection may be some indication that he is con-
cerned more with the content of the information being imparted than with
the effect on production. Therefore, application solely to union-oriented
solicitation and distribution is a relevant factor which ithust be weighed
along with other indicators of employer discriminatory initent, such as his
prior history of antiunion animus.
C. The Employer's "Violation" of His OWn No-Solicitation
and No-Distribution Rules
A question of discriminatory motive arises when an employer, who
enforces a presumptively valid no-solicitation or no-distribution rule, 'Vio-
lates" his own rule by engaging in noncoercive but antiunion solicitation
during his employees' working time, or by distributing noncoercive but
antiunion literature in the working area, and refuses an employee request
76 NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1946); William
Davies Co., 135 F.2d 179, 181 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 770 (1943); Time-O-
Matic, Inc., 121 N.L.R1B. 179 (1958), enforced, 264 F.2d 96 (7th Cit. 1959) ; Oden-
bach Shipbuilding Corp., 64 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1945).77 See, e.g., NLRB v. W. T. Grant Co., 315 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1963) ; cf. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 295 (1951); H. & H. Mfg. Co., 87 N.L.R.B.
1373, 1375 (1949); Merrimac Hat Corp., 85 N.L.R.B. 329, 331 (1949).
78 NLRB v. Gallup Am. Coal Co., 131 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1942) ; Revere Camera
Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1658, 1663 (1961), enforced, 304 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1962); Ford
Radio & Mica Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 1046, 1071 (1956), enforceinent denied on other
grounds, 258 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1958); Stainless Ware Co. of America, 87 N.L.R.B.
138, 175 (1949); Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1364-65 (1949);
cf. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 405 (1953).
79 Revere Camera Co., mipra note 78, at 1665; Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co.,
supra note 78, at 1364-65.
80 See Star-Brite Indus., Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1010-11 (1960); Bludworth
Constr. Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 385, 387 (1959); Pacemaker Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 987,
989, enforced, 260 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958).
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for equal time.8 ' Although it is arguable that it is a part of the manage-
ment's prerogative 8 2 for an employer to enforce rules governing the em-
ployees' activities during working time while not binding himself by the
same rules, such a policy still could constitute discrimination against the
employees' union activity. The employer's solicitation of employees during
their working time, or distribution of antiunion literature in the working
area, interferes to some extent with the production and efficiency of his
business and creates a danger of littering. Therefore, his actions may
indicate that his enforcement of the rules is primarily designed to impede
the flow of organizational information 8 or that there is no real business
necessity for the restrictions,8 rendering them unwarranted interferences
with organizational rights.
However, where only the employer solicits or distributes, he is never-
theless able to control the amount of solicitation or distribution and the
extent of its interference with production and cleanliness; that control is
lost or at least attenuated when his employees solicit or distribute. Con-
sequently, the employer's enforcement of his no-solicitation or no-distribu-
tion rules, at the same time as he "violates" these rules, may be justified
by his desire to maintain control over the extent of interference with his
business.
A further argument for the validity of the employer's enforcement of
his rules, even though he "violates" them, is based upon the so-called em-
ployer free speech provisions of section 8(c) of the Act,85 which state that
an employer may lawfully express, orally or in written or printed form,
his views, arguments, or opinions to his employees regarding organizational
matters, unless such expression contains a threat of reprisal, force, or
promise of benefit. It has been argued 6 that if an employer must lift
his presumptively valid restrictions on employee solicitation or distribution,
a condition not contained in the statute would be added to this right of ex-
pression. Although it has been argued that employer enforcement of rules
against employees is distinguishable from the validity of the employer's
expression of his views,87 a price is placed upon his section 8(c) rights if
he may not enforce these rules when he engages in such protected
expression.
8
81 See NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 363 (1958).
82 Nutone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1154-55 (1955), modified, 243 F.2d 593 (D.C.
Cir. 1956), rev'd, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
3 See United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rezd,
357 U.S. 357 (1958).
84 Id. at 598-99.
8561 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958).
8 6 See, e.g., NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954);
Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 616-19 (1951) (dissenting opinion), inodified,
197 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905
(1953).
87United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593, 599-600 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rev'd,
357 U.S. 357 (1958) ; Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 410-27 (1953) (dis-
senting opinion) ; Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, supra note 86, at 614-15.
88 Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 405-06 (1953) ; Bonwit Teller, Inc.,
supra note 86, at 616-19.
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The Supreme Court directly faced this issue in the leading case of
NLRB v. United Steelworkers.P The Court clearly rejected an expansive
interpretation of section 8(c) of the Act, considering immaterial
9° the
fact that in one of the cases under review the employer's solicitational
activities were coercive 91 and, hence, unprotected by section 8(c), while
in the companion case, the employer had only engaged in clearly protected
noncoercive solicitation.9 2 The Court held that before the Board may find
that an employer who solicits or distributes in "violation" of his own rules
commits an unfair labor practice by continuing to enforce these presump-
tively valid rules, it must find that continued enforcement creates a serious
imbalance in the employees' opportunities to counteract the effect of the
employer's antiunion solicitation or distributionP The question arises as
to whether this rationale establishes a prerequisite to proof of invalidity of
a rule that it create a serious communicational imbalance between employer
and employees even where the employer's "violations" of the rule are not a
basis for the charge of invalidity. The few cases directly facing this issue
are in conflict. In NLRB v. Rockwell Mfg. Co.,94 the Third Circuit held
that under Steelworkers the Board, in deciding whether special circum-
stances justify a presumptively invalid no-distribution rule, must consider
not only evidence of the employer's business need, but also of the effect on
the employees' organizational ability, and stated that the necessary quantum
of evidence of business need varies inversely with the rule's impact on the
employees' organizational effort. However, in Tinte-O-Matic, Inc. v.
NLRB,9 5 the Seventh Circuit, in approving the Board's invalidation of a
no-distribution rule as discriminatorily motivated, limited United Steel-
workers to its facts.98 A similar view has recently been expressed by the
Second Circuit in sustaining the Board's invalidation of a distribution ban
in a nonworking area.
7
A thread common to these cases and United Steelworkers is that in
each the employer was enforcing a ban on nonworking time employee dis-
tribution in nonworking areas. However, whereas in the cases before the
Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits the rule was attacked as invalid on its
face, the Court in Steelworkers did not pass upon the rule's per se validity
8 9357 U.S. 357 (1958).
90 Id. at 358, 362.
OlAvondale Mills, 115 N.L.R.B. 840 (1956), enforcement denied, 242 F.2d 669
(5th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
Another possible explanation of the Court's rejection of the broader reading of
§ 8(c) may have been a desire to allow the Board flexibility in striking down pre-
sumptively valid no-solicitation and no-distribution rules where a serious communi-
cational imbalance is caused by the employer's "violation" even though these "vio-
lations" in themselves are protected by § 8(c).
92 Nutone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1955), modified, 243 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir.
1956), revd, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
93 357 U.S. at 363-64.
04271 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1959).
95 264 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1959).
96 Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 96, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1959).
97 NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128, 131-32 (2d Cir. 1963).
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since this was conceded by all concerned. Indeed, the Court clearly identi-
fied the only issue before it:
The very narrow and almost abstract question here derives from
the claim that, when the employer himself engages in anti-union
solicitation that if engaged in by employees would constitute a
violation of the rule . . . his enforcement of an otherwise valid
no-solicitation rule against the employees is itself an unfair labor
practice.9 8
In answering this question the Court rejected the theory of the Board and
the court of appeals that the employer's failure to "obey" his own rule while
enforcing it against his employees constituted discriminatory enforcement
of the rule, thereby removing the issue of discrimination from the case.
Consequently, the Court held that if a no-solicitation or no-distribution rule
is "otherwise valid" and is not discriminatorily enforced, its enforcement
may not be held unlawful absent a 'showing of serious harm to the em-
ployees' communicational ability.
The only support for the broader reading of the Steelworkers opinion
lies in the Court's statement that a showing that the rules "truly diminished
the ability of the labor organizations involved to carry their messages to
the employees" is "a vital consideration in determining the validity of a no-
solicitation rule . . ." " In support thereof, the Court cited portions
of Republic Aviation Corp. and Babcock & Wilcox Co. which cast this
dictum as merely a restatement of prior lawY1°° Moreover, since the show-
ing of harm to the organizational effort required by Steelworkers is sub-
stantially the same as that required by Babcock & Wilcox, a broad reading
of this dictum would require the conclusion that the Court in Steelworkers
intended to overrule the previously established distinction between employee
and nonemployee solicitation and distribution. A ruling of such breadth
should not be so lightly inferred from dictum given the Court's own
statement as to the narrow issue decided. The Steelworkers opinion should
be read merely as settling the longstanding dispute ' 01 as to whether or not
the employer who solicits or distributes in "violation" of his rules must
allow employees an equal opportunity to reply to his antiunion messages.
102
98 NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 362 (1958).
99 Id. at 363.
100 The portion of the Republic Aviation opinion cited merely indicates that in
establishing presumptions of validity or invalidity of these rules the Board should
balance the need of the employer and harm to the employee's organizational activities.
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945). The portion of
the Babcock & Wilcox opinion cited indicates the special consideration to be given
to the harm to organizational efforts in the case of a ban on nonemployee solicitation
and distribution. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
101 See generally Wollett & Rowen, Employer Speech and Related Issues, 16
OHIo ST. L.J. 380, 387-95 (1955) ; Note, 43 GEo. L. Ray. 405 (1955) ; Note, 38 VA.
L. REv. 1037 (1952).
102 Compare Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953), with NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357
(1958), and May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
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So read, the Steelworkers case would allow the Board to find unlawful
a discriminatory motive from a solicitation or distribution ban after a con-
sideration of all the facts and circumstances, even though the restriction
does not create a serious communicational imbalance between employer and
employees. Moreover, the Board would remain free to .consider the em-
ployer "violation" of his own rules as relevant to this factual finding. In
the final analysis the ultimate responsibility for maldng this factual deter-
mination should rest on the Board.'3
John V. Murray
103The difficulty of finding discrimination in the promulgation or enforcement
of these rules raises the question of whether the Board should attempt to find a
subjective intent to discriminate or an inference of employer discrimation by an
objective appraisal of all the circumstances, e.g., a pattern of past unfair labor prac-
tices. The Board's discussion in Stoddard-Quirk of the impact on employees in rela-
tion to the scope of a presumptively valid rule may foreshadow such an objective
approach. This approach may be justified on evidentiary grounds; however, the
Board should not hesitate to find a subjective intent to discriminate in order to pre-
vent use of communicational restrictions as an employer weapon against collective
organization.
